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ABSTRACT 
The Amazon Kindle eBook reader supports a wide range of capabilities beyond reading books. This 
functionality includes an inbuilt cellular data connection known as Whispernet. The Kindle provides 
web browsing, an application framework, eBook delivery and other services over this connection. The 
historic data left by user interaction with this device may be of forensic interest. Analysis of the 
Amazon Kindle device has resulted in a method to reliably extract and interpret data from these 
devices in a forensically complete manner. 
Keywords: forensics, digital forensics, kindle, mobile, embedded, ebook, ereader 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Amazon Kindle eBook reader provides significant functionality aside from that of simply reading 
eBooks. As the Kindle is an embedded computing platform it is possible to deploy a wide range of 
functionality due to the use of general computing hardware (see Table 1 for details). The Kindle 
platform has grown to include a web browser, which utilizes an inbuilt cellular data connection, an 
application framework, music player, image viewer, AGPS and numerous other capabilities. The 
presence of this functionality leads to a situation where the ability to provide forensic analysis of these 
devices would be quite desirable due to the potential for nefarious use of such features. 
 
Table 1 - Comparison of Kindle Hardware (Amazon, 2010) 
Kindle Specifications 
 Kindle Kindle 2 Kindle DX Kindle DX 2 Kindle 3 
CPU Freescale 
532 MHz, 
ARM-11 
Freescale 
532 MHz, 
ARM-11 
Freescale 
532 MHz, 
ARM-11 
Freescale 
532 MHz, 
ARM-11 
Freescale 
532 MHz, 
ARM-11 
Flash 256MB 2GB 4GB 4GB 4GB 
Comms Cellular/3G Cellular/3G Cellular/3G Cellular/3G  
+ WiFI 
Cellular/3G  
and/or WiFi 
Kernel Linux-2.6.26 Linux-2.6.26 Linux-2.6.26 Linux-2.6.26 Linux-2.6.26 
 
The 2GB of flash storage is divided into four file systems (see figure 1), the last of these is mapped to 
act as a USB mass storage device and is the only file system that can be accessed, viewed or in any 
other way interacted with when the kindle is in its secure state. The other three partitions contain the 
root Linux file system, configuration files and a debug file system respectively. 
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$ fdisk kindle.img  
Disk: kindle geometry: 995/64/63 [4014080 sectors] 
Signature: 0xAA55 
         Starting       Ending 
 #: id  cyl  hd sec -  cyl  hd sec [     start -       size] 
--------------------------------------------------------------
---------- 
*1: 83    0   1   1 - 1023   3  16 [        16 -     819248] 
Linux files* 
 2: 83 1023   3  16 - 1023   3  16 [    819264 -      49152] 
Linux files* 
 3: 83 1023   3  16 - 1023   3  16 [    868416 -      16384] 
Linux files* 
 4: 0B 1023   3  16 - 1023   3  16 [    884800 -    3129280] 
Win95 FAT-32 
 
Figure 1 - Partition Structure of the Kindle 
 
Existing digital forensics software packages have implemented limited support for Kindle devices, 
however there are is currently no support for examination of the flash memory other than the FAT32 
partition (MacForensicsLab, 2010). In the same vein research has been performed by a number of 
individuals in an attempt to derive forensic methodology for the Kindle, however this research has also 
only focused on the FAT32 partition exposed as a USB mass storage device (Huber, 2010b; Hughes, 
2010; newinforensics, 2010).  
2. SECURITY 
The Kindle utilizes a firmware update mechanism that allows for over the air (OTA) or manual 
updates. In the case of both the update file is placed in the root of the mass storage portion of the file 
system. The update is then applied once the user activates this functionality from the system menu of 
the device. 
The update files themselves are essentially signed TAR archives, these are extracted and a shell script 
contained within executed to facilitate the update functionality. The signing mechanism relies on RSA 
encryption in which the update is signed with amazon’s private key and verified with amazon’s public 
key, which is pre-installed on the Kindle device (Hannay, 2010). 
The security functionality can however be defeated as the tar archive is extracted prior to signature 
verification. The most commonly employed exploit to leverage this involves setting the absolute path 
to the public key store in the tar archive, as such prior to signature validation a new public key is 
added to the store. The result of this exploit is that the ability to sign arbitrary updates is gained. The 
jailbreak process described here is illustrated below in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2 - Illustration of Jailbreak Process  
 
3. ACQUISITION METHODOLOGY 
Prior to commencement of this section it is important to note that knowledge of best practice in terms 
of hashing, evidence preservation and documentation are assumed and as such are out of scope of this 
paper. The investigator should ensure that he/she understands the impact that writing data to a device 
can have and the implications on forensic integrity. 
In order to accomplish the acquisition and analysis of the Kindle we must first gain access to the 
device beyond what is available by default. This access is achieved through use of the exploit 
identified in the previous section, the implementation we will be using in this example is the Kindle 
Jailbreak (based on AVNard’s earlier work), this utility includes a standard public/private key pair 
which is known publicly as well as an installation framework (NiLuJe, 2010). At this stage in the 
process we now have the ability to install custom software via the update system. 
In order to gain complete access to the device it is necessary to install some form of remote access 
software on the device. In our case a telnet & SSH server will be installed along side scripts which 
allow for the USB port to be remapped as a USB Ethernet Gadget. The package commonly used to 
achieve this is the “USBNetwork” package, so named as it restores the USB networking functionality 
that was originally present in early versions of the Kindle firmware (NiLuJe, 2010). Once this has 
been accomplished it is possible to establish to start the USBNetwork service by issuing the 
“;debugOn” and “`usbNetwork” commands on the device (without quotes) as shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3 - The “;debugOn” command being issued 
 
Once the USBNetworking package is installed and enabled it is possible to start acquisition. This is 
accomplished through the use of telnet, dd and netcat, this methodology has been commonly 
implemented in live system acquisitions (Burdach, 2005). In this configuration the host system is 
configured to listen for the data transmission, piping the output to dd. Then a telnet connection is 
established to the kindle and data transfer initiated, this process is shown in Figure 4 below. 
 
1. Connect to kindle 
$ telnet 192.168.2.2 
Trying 192.168.2.2... 
Connected to 192.168.2.2. 
Escape character is '^]'. 
 [root@kindle root]#  
 
2. Listen for connection on host sytem 
$ nc -l 55555 | dd of=kindle.img 
3185454+1385484 records in 
4014080+0 records out 
2055208960 bytes transferred in 915.234125 secs (2245555 
bytes/sec) 
 
3. Initiate transfer of data from kindle 
[root@kindle /dev]# dd if=/dev/mmcblk0 | nc 192.168.2.1 55555 
4014080+0 records in 
4014080+0 records out 
 
Figure 4 - Acquiring image of NAND memory 
 
Once this acquisition is complete it may be desirable to split this file into the four file systems that are 
contained within. The details of these can be extracted using fdisk as shown in Figure 1. Once these 
partition boundaries are known we can extract the individual partitions into their own files for 
subsequent analysis as shown in Figure 5. 
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$ dd if=kindle.img of=kindlep1.img skip=16 count=819248 
819248+0 records in 
819248+0 records out 
419454976 bytes transferred in 23.742699 secs (17666693 
bytes/sec) 
$ dd if=kindle.img of=kindlep2.img skip=819264 count=49152 
49152+0 records in 
49152+0 records out 
25165824 bytes transferred in 1.661936 secs (15142477 
bytes/sec) 
$ dd if=kindle.img of=kindlep3.img skip=868416 count=16384 
16384+0 records in 
16384+0 records out 
8388608 bytes transferred in 0.315741 secs (26568018 
bytes/sec) 
$ dd if=kindle.img of=kindlep4.img skip=884800 count=3129280 
3129280+0 records in 
3129280+0 records out 
1602191360 bytes transferred in 141.444850 secs (11327322 
bytes/sec) 
 
Figure 5 - Splitting disk image into individual partition images 
 
The completion of this splitting leads us to the point where these images can be analysed using 
traditional computer forensics methodologies. The next section includes information on the various 
file systems and location of data that has been deemed to be of forensic interest. 
4. DATA OF INTEREST 
Partition 1 (root file system) 
Location Description 
/opt/wan/firmware/mt-
3/version.dat 
Firmware version indicator 
/opt/amazon/ebook/config/ Configuration files 
/opt/amazon/ebook/prefs/ Preferences files 
/etc/uks/ Public key store, keys other amazon’s and the key created 
during jailbreak may indicate tampering 
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Partition 2 (/var/local) 
Location Description 
/audio/ Audio settings 
/eink/screen_saver_last The a reference to the last screen saver image displayed 
/java/prefs/cookies Cookies used to uniquely identify this device to amazon. 
These are persistent. 
/java/prefs/DevicePasswordDa
ta.pw 
Password data for this device 
/java/prefs/browser/bookmarks Web browser bookmarks 
/java/prefs/browser/cookie.dat Web browser cookies (no cache is present, this may 
provide limited historical evidence of web access 
/java/prefs/browser/settings Web browser configuration 
/java/prefs/com.amazon.ebook.
booklet.reader/social-
clipping/social-prefs 
Credentials and accounts associated with social networking 
services (twitter, facebook, etc) that have been set up for 
use with the device 
/java/prefs/com.amazon.ebook.
framework 
User settings including: country, timezone & WAN status 
/java/prefs Details of the user, kindle name & user name 
/log/ Detailed logs of users interaction with the device, including 
time stamps 
/wan/ Network configuration 
 
Partition 4 (User file system – available via USB mass storage) 
Location Description 
/documents Books and other publications for consumption on device 
/music Music and other audio for consumption on device 
/system/Search Indexes/ History of each search conducted on the device 
/system/com.amazon.ebook.bo
oklet.reader/reader.pref 
Contains details of last book read, font size selected and 
dictionary currently in use. 
 
Note: On all test systems partition 3 was zero filled. Based on investigation it has been determined that 
this area is used for diagnostic purposes and likely will not contain information outside of the 
development environment. 
5. CONCLUSION 
eBook devices such as the Kindle are gathering increased interest from the forensic community as they 
become increasingly popular. The included cellular data capability of the Kindle specifically may 
make it a candidate for nefarious purposes, as the there is no data cost associated with the global data 
service (Hannay, 2010). In addition to data functionality the inclusion of an application framework and 
development kit in beta release will only lead to increased use of the product for purposes that were 
once met by the traditional computing paradigm. 
The initial efforts of the forensic community have focused on acquisition of only a portion of the 
internal storage of the device as this area is readily accessible as a USB mass storage device (Huber, 
2010a, 2010b; Hughes, 2010; MacForensicsLab, 2010; newinforensics, 2010). This paper has gone 
beyond the existing methodologies and provided a mechanism for the acquisition of the complete 
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internal NAND memory and analysis of same. In order for this result to be achieved however some 
data must be written to the device and in doing so there is the possibility of data being overwritten. 
However aside from invasive hardware based acquisition there are no current known techniques that 
would allow for complete acquisition without this approach.  
Research into small and embedded device forensics is ongoing, with increased focus on complete 
acquisition of all relevant data from these systems, including flash storage, memory and data stored on 
individual microcontrollers. 
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